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Casenotes
CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHRASE "DEATH
WITHOUT ISSUE" AND SIMILAR TERMS
Zeller v. McGuckian'
MALCOLM B. SMmI*
This was an appeal from a decree construing the will
of one Thomas McGuckian, and ordering the distribution
of his estate. By the will the testator left all his real and
personal estate to his wife "for and during her natural life".
After death of the wife the property was to go to "my son
George McGuckian, or in case of his death to his issue, if
any. In the event that my son should die without issue I
give, devise, and bequeath all the aforesaid property, not
having been previously disposed of, to my nephew, George
Zender, absolutely". The court was petitioned to assume
jurisdiction of the trust created by the will, which it did,
and appointed one of the executors as trustee. The wife
subsequently died, and the son petitioned the court to order
a termination of the trust and distribution of the corpus.
In affirming the decree ordering distribution, the Court
of Appeals construed the will as creating alternative gifts
in remainder, and said: "Where two alternative gifts are
preceded by a life estate, the alternative words of the gift
are applied to the event of death of the first legatee occurring before the period of possession or distribution as fixed
by the will. The first legatee, surviving that period, becomes
absolutely and indefeasibly entitled; but if he should die
before that period, his previous investure of title becomes
divested, and those intended to take by the alternative
gift become vested with the estate by way of substitution".'
Thus the court construed the will to manifest an intent on
the part of the testator that if the son survived the life
tenant, then he would be entitled to the entire estate absolutely. In case of his death before the death of the life tenant, the property would go to his issue, if any; but if he
should die without issue before the life tenant, then the
estate would go to Zender. In other words the court construed the reference to "death without issue" merely as
* Third year student, University of Maryland School of Law.
'58 A. 2d 123 (1948).
2 Zeller v. McGuckian, 8upra, 124.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XI

operating to defer the time of absolute vesting only until
the death of the life tenant.
The construction of the phrase "death without issue",
which is dealt with in this case, suggests consideration of
the rules which determine the period to which the happening of the contingency is referred: (1) death of the
legatee or devisee without issue at any time, or (2) before
the period of distribution, or (3) before the death of the
life tenant, or (4) before the death of the testator. The
Restatement of Property3 speaks of the problem as determining the "critical date" to which one looks to discover
whether the failure of issue has occurred. As preliminary,
for the purpose of determining to what period the happening of the contingency is referred, it generally makes no
difference that another word is substituted for the word
"issue". Thus alternative remainders or executory devises
over upon the contingency of death without "heirs", "descendents", or "children" will be governed essentially by
the same rules as applied when the word "issue" is used,
the only difference being that when the word "children"
is used, it normally denotes only issue of the first generation.4
Definite and Indefinite Failure of Issue Theories5
In the early English law, prior to the Statute of Uses,
if a devise was made "to A and his heirs, but if he die without issue, then to B and his heirs", the gift to B, taking effect
by way of a shifting use, was void, for the reason that the
common law would not allow a remainder after a fee simple
estate. But because of a desire on the part of the courts to
save the gift to B, such a gift was construed as a remainder
after an estate tail, the theory being that the provision for
failure of issue created a fee tail by implication as to the
first taker, and a remainder over to B upon the expiration
of the fee tail in A. After passage of the Statute of Uses,
such a construction was no longer necessary, because shifting uses were held valid as a result of that Statute. But
the application of the old rule for nearly 200 years made
it too well entrenched to be lightly overcome, and the
estate tail by implication prevailed. Also after the Rule
against Perpetuities became established the medieval
judges were reluctant to change. To save B's gift as a
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sect. 266, Comm. d.
'Ibid., Sect. 267, Comms. c and d.
See Warren, Gifts Over on Definite Failure of Issue, 39 Yale L. J. 332
(1930).
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shifting use from the operation of that Rule it would have
been necessary to construe the gift as taking effect at some
definite period, such as upon the death of A without heirs
(or issue) surviving A. But the old theory was still followed, giving B, by implication, a remainder after an estate
tail. Thus the phrase "death without issue" was held to
signify a period whenever A's line of descent ran out, no
matter when. This became known as the "Indefinite Failure of Issue" theory, and was followed, in England, until
the passage of the Wills Act of 1838.0 This statute provided that unless a contrary intention shall appear in the
will, the words shall be construed to be a definite failure
of issue, i.e. a failure of issue in the lifetime or at the death
of the named person, and not a period whenever the named
person's line of descent runs out.
In this country, although the early cases generally followed the indefinite failure theory, at the present time
there is at least some form of statute in almost all states
covering the situation at least partially. The Restatement
of Property' follows the definite failure theory both as to
deeds inter vivos and wills. The first Maryland statute on
the point was passed in 1862, and adopted the definite failure theory where the phrase appears in wills, unless a
contrary intention appears in the will;' and in 1886 a similar
provision was made with respect to deeds.9 For these reasons the remainder of this discussion deals only with cases
following the definite failure theory.
The Edwards Case
The whole question of the period to which the contingency of death without issue is to be referred is elaborately
brought out and examined in the early English case of
Edwards v. Edwards.10 There the testator left property in
trust for his wife during widowhood, and thereafter to
his three children, with the provision that "if any of my
children shall die, and leaving no children, his or her
share shall be equally divided between the other two". The
widow died thereafter leaving the three children surviving
her, but subsequently a son died without issue. The Court
held that his share did not pass to his brother and sister,
61

Vict. ch. 26, Sect. 29 (1837).
' Supra, n. 3, Sect. 266, Comm. b.
6 Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sect. 347; construed in 86 Md. 576 (1897) ; 108
Md. 487 (1908).
9 Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sect. 108.
10 15 Bear. 361 (1852).
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but became absolute in him when he survived his mother,
the life tenant, even though he subsequently died without
issue.
The Court pointed out four classes of cases in which
questions of this description arise. First, a devise "to A,
but if he shall die, then to B". In this class of cases the
testator obviously intended to create a contingency, because
the word "if" appears. But actually there is no contingency,
because A is certain to die-the event which is sought to
be made a contingency is certain to happen. There is no
contingency about death except as to the time thereof.
Therefore, by the use of this phrase it is presumed the
testator intended that A should not take if he died before
the testator, but that the property should go to B in that
event, thus preventing a possible lapse. Rather than cut
down the absolute estate in A and make it a life estate
with remainder to B, the clause is given this substitutionary
construction; i.e., that the property is intended to go to A
or to B, but not to both; if A outlives the testator, he takes,
if not, B takes.
The second class of cases is where there is a devise "to
A, but if he dies without issue, then to B". Here, a real
contingency is expressed without reference to the time of
death, and it would seem that the ordinary meaning should
be given the words, so that upon A's death without surviving issue, whenever his death occurs, B should be entitled to take. But although this seems to be the most logical
conclusion based on the words used, not all cases have
reached that result, as will be shown later.
The third class is similar to the first, in that no real
contingency is expressed, but this class has the added factor of an intervening life estate; e.g., "to W for life, remainder to A, but if A dies, then to B". Since there is no
real contingency expressed, it must be assumed that the
testator had in mind the time of death when he used the
words. Thus it is implied that the testator intended the
gift over to take effect on the death of A before the period
of possession or distribution; and here, as distinguished
from the first class, the period of distribution is at the
termination of the life estate, rather than at the death of
the testator. Therefore, if A survives the life tenant, the
gift to him becomes absolute, and only upon his death before the death of the life tenant can the alternative remainder to B take effect.
The fourth class of cases discussed in this case is where
there is a gift "to W for life, remainder to A, but if A die
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without issue, then to B". The added factor of the intervening life estate in this case caused the Court to lay down
the rule that the words of contingency must be construed
to mean the occurrence. of the contingent event before the
period of distribution, and thus only upon the death of A
without issue in the lifetime of the life tenant can the
alternative remainder to B operate. If A survives the life
tenant, his estate becomes absolute,. even though he may
subsequently die without issue. The principle was said to
be based on the desire of the courts to relieve the suspension
of absolute vesting as soon as possible. However, the Court
seemed to overlook the fact that in laying down this rule
it was making an unnecessary implication. As in the second
class of cases, there is a real contingency expressed here,
death without issue, and to give the words their ordinary
meaning would seem to necessitate construing it as meaning
death without issue whenever death of the named person
occurs, whether before or after the death of the life tenant.
Instead of construing this class of cases similarly to the
second class, in which the same contingency was also expressed, the Court compared it to the third class, where no
real contingency is expressed. The fourth rule laid down
by the Edwards case was later rejected in England, and
the rule for both the second and fourth classes is considered
to refer the contingency to the death of the named person
whenever it occurs," thus giving the words their natural
meaning. But probably the majority of American decisions,
involving a life estate with a gift over of the remainder
upon death of the first taker without issue, have held the
contingency
to be referable to the period of the life ten2
ancy.
Rule Which Gives Words Their
Natural Unrestricted Meaning
Where there is a gift "to A, but if he die without
issue, then to B", or similar wording in which the death of
the first taker is referred to in connection with some collateral event, a number of cases recognize as the general
rule that the words should be given their ordinary and
literal meaning, and that the contingency of death without
issue will be held to refer to death of the first taker either
before or after the death of the testator, unless there is a
showing of contrary intent from the context of the will or
n O'Mahoney v. Burdett, L. R. 7 H. L. 388 (1874) ; see also 25 L. R. A.,
N. S.1051 n.
2 See text and cases cited under heading "Rule Which Limits the Contingency to Death Before Termination of Antecedent Estate", infra.
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the circumstances surrounding the disposition.1 3 It is said
in Ashfield v. Curtis4 that "The rule may be regarded as
well established that when the death of the first taker is
coupled with circumstances which may or may not take
place, as, for instance, death under age or without children,
a devise over, unless controlled by other provisions of the
will, takes effect according to the ordinary and literal meaning of the words, upon the death under the circumstances
indicated, at any time, whether before or after the death of
the testator". This is the rule adopted by the Restatement, 5 and, from this writer's research, it appears to be
with the weight of authority. These cases base their reasoning not only upon the fact that such a construction
gives the words their ordinary and literal meaning, but
also upon the reasoning expressed in the Edwards case,
that although where there is a gift to one with a limitation
over to another upon the death of the first taker, without
any other words of contingency, the courts will imply the
contingency of death of the first taker in the lifetime of
the testator, based on the theory that he must have had
such a contingency in mind; yet where there is an actual
contingency expressed, such as death before coming of age
or without issue, the courts should not import a meaning
and add words to the will by construing it to mean death
without issue before the testator's death. In the latter
case, it is said, a contingency already exists, and it is
unnecessary to imply the further contingency of death before the testator's death.
Although some writers imply that the rule in Maryland
is contra to this rule giving the words their unrestricted
meaning, 6 there are at least ten Maryland cases which have
so construed the phrase, even though not expressly saying
that they were following any rule of construction when
I Estate of Briggs, 186 Cal. 351, 199 P. 322 (1921) ; Clark v. Leavitt,
330 Ill. 350, 161 N. E. 751 (1928) ; Smith v. Ballard, 117 Ky. 179, 77
S. W. 714 (1903) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 99 N. C. 309, 5 S. E. 430 (1888);
Britton v. Thorton, 112 U. S. 526 (1884).
'4 229 Ill. 139, 82 N. E. 276 (1907).
15Supra, n. 3, Sect. 267 "When property is limited by an otherwise
effective conveyance 'to B and his heirs, but if B dies without issue,
then -to C'. or by other words of similar import, then, unless a contrary
intent of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances,
the interest of C can become a present interest if, but only if, B is unsurvived by issue at the time of his death, whenever that may occur".
"Warren, Gifts Over on Definite Failure of Issue, supra, n. 5; and see
25 L. R. A., N. S. 1054-5 n. where it is said that Maryland and New York
tend to treat "in event of death" and "in event of death without issue"
as being the same thing, and refer them both to death of the legatee in
testator's lifetime.
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doing so.' 7 In all of these cases, the Court said that it would
construe the will according to the intent of the testator as
it could be gathered from the terms of the will; and since
there was nothing else in the will to show any other intent,
the Court merely gave the words their natural meaning,
without making any presumption that the testator intended
only to prevent a lapse and thus restrict the contingency
to his lifetime, and without declaring that they were following any general rule of construction controlling in the
absence of a contrary intent. They merely looked at the
will without reference to any rules, and said such is the
intent of the testator because that is the natural effect of
the words he has used. This writer believes that the later
Maryland cases restricting the contingency to the lifetime
of the testator were actually based upon the special context
of the will involved, and that they do not lay down any
rule to be followed in the absence of a contrary intent. These
cases will be discussed along with those from other jurisdictions which reach the result of referring the contingency
to the testator's lifetime. It is sufficient here to state that
although no Maryland case has laid down this rule, giving
the words their unrestricted meaning, as a general rule of
construction to control in the absence of contrary intent,
still there are Maryland cases which have reached such a
result, and it is therefore this writer's opinion that the
question may still be open in Maryland.
Some of the earlier cases from other jurisdictions have
made a distinction, in applying this rule, between bequests
of personal property and devises of real estate. It has been
said that in bequests of personalty, the contingency of death
without issue will be referred to the happening of such
event in the lifetime of the testator, because personalty
perishes with the using, and the testator cannot be presumed to have looked beyond the distribution which he
has directed his executor to make." However, this distinction seems to have been refuted in later cases as being
unsound, and those courts which follow the rule as to real
estate also follow it now as to personalty. 19
11Gambrill v. Forest Lodge, 66 Md. 17 (1886) : Devecmon v. Shaw. 70
Md. 219 (1889) ; Lednum v. Cecil, 76 Md. 149 (1892) ; Hutchins v. Pierce,
80 Md. 434 (1895) ; Weybright v. Powell, 86 Md. 573 (1897) ; Wilson v. Bull,
97 Md. 128 (1903)
Stonebraker v. Zollickoffer, 52 Md. 154 (1879) ; Mason
v. Johnson, 47 Md. 437 (1877) ; Thomas v. Levering, 73 Md. 451 (1891) ; and
by dictum in 163 Md. 136 (1932).
18Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W. 671 (1904).
29First National Bank v. De Pauw, 75 F. 775 (1896); Carpenter v.
Sangamon Loan & T. Co., 229 Ill. 486, 82 N. E. 418 (1907); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY, Sect. 267, Comm. b.
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This general rule for the construction of the phrase is
always subordinate to a contrary intention of the testator
appearing in the context of the will. Therefore, those courts
which declare the general rule to be that the phrase
"death without issue", or words of similar import, refers
to death whenever it occurs, will refer the clause to the
period before the testator's death, or before distribufion
(when distribution is postponed), or before the termination
of an antecedent estate, when the context of the will requires such a construction. Thus where the testator fixes
the time for the distribution of the gift at a period subsequent to his death, and it is evident from the context of the
will that he must also have had this period in mind when
making the dispositions and the contingencies provided for,
the contingency of "death without issue" will be referred
to that period, rather than to the death of the named legatee
at any time.20 Or where the gift to the first taker is itself
contingent, then the limitation over to the second taker
upon death of the first taker without issue will be construed
to refer to the time of vesting. 2
Probably the most well-developed exception to the rule,
based on a contrary intent, is where there is a gift in
absolute terms followed by a limitation over both on the
event of death leaving issue and death without issue. In
such case, the contingency is restricted to the lifetime of
the testator. This exception only applies where the gift
to the first taker is in absolute terms, because the argument
is based on the reasoning that by providing for all contingencies, either death with or death without issue, the limitation over is in effect made a certainty, and would operate
to cut down the absolute gift to a mere life estate if it were
not referred to the period before distribution. For example,
where a testator left property to his two sons in fee, with
the provision that if either son should die leaving children
his share should go to those children, but if either son
should die without issue his share should go to the surviving
son, the Court found that the gift was absolute in terms
and since the limitations over collectively provided for the
death of the donee under all possible circumstances, that
'*Wilson v. Bryan, 90 Ky. 482, 14 S. W. 533 (1890); Huff v. Browning,
96 Ill. App. 612 (1901) ; Claggett v. Bowie, 130 Md. 437 (1917) ; see also
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sect. 268. Although this rule is treated here as
an exception to the general rule, in most states it seems to be regarded
as a separate and distinct rule of construction. See heading "Rule Which
Limits the Contingency to Other Intermediate Periods Mentioned in the
Will", infra.
Fishback v. boesting, 183 Ill. 463, 56 N. E. 62 (1899).
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to avoid a repugnant construction which would reduce the
estate to one for life, the words of contingency must be
construed to refer to the happening of the event in the
testator's lifetime.22 The Restatement of Property also supports this exception,23 but points out that some courts construe the gift to the first taker as being a life estate, and
in such cases the "critical date" is still the death of the
first taker whenever it occurs, and the limitation over cannot take effect unless the first taker is unsurvived by issue
at that time. Thus, with regard to the gift over, the effect
is the same as if the general rule discussed here applied.
The last important exception is where there is a gift
over to the survivors of a class, in the event that the first
taker should die without issue. In such case those courts
which ordinarily give the words their natural unrestricted
meaning usually say that the words of survivorship evidence a contrary intention on the part of the testator to
confine the contingency to the period when the survivorship
is to be determined. Little discussion has been given the
matter in the decided cases, but the theory is probably
based on the dual aspect of the contingency; i.e., first, dying
without issue, and second, dying within the period before
the ascertainment of the beneficiaries named in the limitation over. When the latter period has arrived, it is obviously then impossible to ascertain the beneficiaries of the
gift over unless the contingency is referred to the happening of the event before the period of ascertainment. The
courts determine to what period the words of survivorship
refer, and then restrict the contingency of death without
issue to that period also. For example, where a testator
makes an immediate gift of his residuary estate to his three
sons, with the provision that if either should die leaving no
issue, then the share of such deceased child shall go to the
survivors or survivor, then the contingency of death without issue is referred to the period before the death of the
testator, because that is considered the period for ascertainment of the survivorship, the gift being a present gift and
distribution not postponed. Since the words of survivorship
are referred to the death of the testator, the contingency
Barrell v. Barrell, 38 N. J. Eq. 60 (1884) ; see also Mitchell v. Pittsburgh,
Ft. Worth & C. R. Co., 165 Pa. 645, 31 A. 67 (1895); King v. King,
215 Ill. 100, 74 N. E. 89 (1905). This argument could also have been made
In certain Maryland cases which restricted the contingency to period
before testator's death. cf. Lumpkin v. Lumpkin, 108 Md. 470 (1908),
and Godwin v. Kemp, 129 Md. 159 (1916). Thus it is suggested that special
context controlled those decisions.
Supra, n. 3, Sect. 267, Comm. G.
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of death without issue is also referred to that period.2 4
The reasoning seems highly technical, and the courts state
it as an exception to the general rule without going into
the reasoning behind it. Where a life estate precedes the
gift to the first taker, then the words of survivorship, and
also the contingency of death without issue are usually
referred to the period before the death of the life tenant.
The problem of an intervening life estate is usually considered to involve a separate rule of construction and will
be discussed under a subsequent heading.
Rule Which Limits the Contingency to Death
Without Issue in Testator's Lifetime
As distinguished from that line of cases giving the words
"death without issue" their natural unrestricted meaning,
there is a second line of decisions which declare the general
rule to be that where there is an absolute devise in fee,
followd by a provision for a gift over to another in the event
that the first taker dies without issue, then the words are
not a curtailment of the prior devise or bequest, but merely
make the gift one in the alternative or substitutionary, and
to take effect only on the death of the first taker without
issue in the lifetime of the testator. 5 Various reasons are
given for adopting this construction, causing the court to
believe that such was the intent of the testator, some saying
his purpose in including the phrase was not to cut down
the absolute estate given to the first taker, but merely to
make provision for a substituted devisee in case of a lapse.',
Others say such a construction is adopted in order to avoid
repugnancy, and because the law favors early vesting of
estates;27 or that the first taker is always the primary object
of the testator's bounty and his absolute estate should not
be cut down without a clear showing of such an intent on
the part of the testator.2" The New York courts, although
declaring this rule to be the law of that state based on
precedent and authority, do not seem to be entirely satis2 Kohtz v. Eldred, 208 Ill. 60, 69 N. E. 900 (1904) ; Carpenter v. Hazelrigg,
103 Ky. 538, 45 S. W. 666 (1898); Reams v. Spann, 26 S. C. 561, 2 S. E.
412 (1887).

2 Quilliam v. Union Trust Co., 194 Ind. 521, 142 N. E. 214 (1924);
Washbon v. Cope, et al., 144 N. Y. 287, 39 N. E. 388 (1895) ; Frank v. Frank,
120 Tenn. 569, 111 S. W. 1119 (1908) ; App. v. App., 106 Va. 253, 55 S. E.
672 (1906); Burnham v. Burnham, 101 Conn. 529, 126 Atl. 704 (1924);
Steinbrenner v. Dreher, 140 Ohio St. 305, 43 N. E. 2d 283 (1942) ; Collins
v. Collins, 116 Iowa 703, 88 N. W. 1097 (1902).
" Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 41 A. 813 (1898).
2 Tarbell v. Smith, 125 Iowa 388, 101 N. W. 118 (1904).
2 Mickley's Appeal, 92 Pa. 514 (1880).
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fled with its soundness, for in one case it is stated:
It is by no means certain that it was not the intention
of the testator to control and provide for the ulterior
devolution of the title, after it had been enjoyed during
life by the primary devisee, in case he then died without
issue, and such a construction would, it would seem, give
effect more completely to the language used". 9
There have been several Maryland cases seemingly
applying the general rule under discussion here, and restricting the contingency to the lifetime of the testator,"
and, as was previously stated, these cases have led some
writers to say that such is the law in Maryland. However,
careful scrutiny of these cases will show that the Court
has never flatly laid down the general rule as such. Probably the strongest case is Lumpkin v. Lumpkin 31 where the
language used implied the existence of a general rule
more than in any other case. But even in that case the
Court seemed to rely chiefly on the intent of the testator,
and not upon a rule of construction controlling in the
absence of intent. In that case there were a number of
gifts to children of the testator throughout the will, and
certain gifts to the wife, with a provision at the end of the
will that if any child should die without leaving issue, then
his share was to go to the wife and surviving children.
The Court cited numerous cases, particularly from New
York, following the rule restricting the contingency to the
lifetime of the testator, and also cited certain Maryland
cases restricting the operation of the gift over to the testator's lifetime where the limitation over was only upon
death, and not "death without issue". The Court said that
the same rationale in the latter group applied also to the
case before it, and for this reason, it has been said that
Maryland and New York treat a limitation over upon
"death" the same as one upon "death without issue". But
actually the chief ground for the decision in the Lumpkin
case was the intent of the testator, based on the terms of
the will and the circumstances of the disposition. The
Court said, "In our opinion Mr. Lumpkin has indicated in
his will with reasonable certainty the time . . .prior to
which he intended the death of one of his children without
issue to occur in order to cause its share to pass over to
2 Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 47,

8 N. E. 247 (1886).
" Lumpkin v. Lumpkin, 108 Md. 470 (1908); Duering v. Brill, 127 Md. 104
(1915) ; Godwin v. Kemp, 129 Md. 159 (1916) ; Md. Realty Corp. v. Mitchell,
128 Md. 698 (1916).
= Supra, n.30.
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his wife and other children,""2 and then went on to point
out that the limitation over being in favor of the wife
as well as surviving children, he must have had in mind
the death of a child before his own death, because the
wife was well on in years and could not be expected to
be alive to take the gift over if the limitation were meant
to operate whenever the child died, before or after the
testator. Further, the word "inheritance" was used to describe the share of the children in the limiting clause, this
also indicating that the testator was thinking in terms of
his own death. And finally, the Court said, after discussing
the rule of construction as laid down in other states, "...
but we do not pursue this subject further, as we rely for
our conclusion mainly on the will itself read in the light
of the circumstances surrounding the testator when he
made it." 3 Similarly, all the other cases restricting the
contingency to the testator's lifetime have relied not on
a rule of construction, but upon what the Court believed
to be the actual intent of the testator, the Court saying in
Duering v. Brill,34 ". . . We do not think this belongs to
the class of cases where a fee is first given, and is then
made defeasible, if the devisee dies without issue". It is
for this reason, and in view of the several cases previously
cited, that this writer believes that where there is nothing
in the will or surrounding circumstances to change the
natural effect of the words, the Maryland courts will give
them their unrestricted meaning; and that it is only where
the language and circumstances require such a result that
the substitutionary construction restricting the contingency
to the testator's lifetime will be given the phrase.
With regard to those states adopting this general rule,
it should be noted that it is only applied when the gift
to the first taker is of an absolute interest. Thus where
the estate to the first taker is a life estate, or other estate
less than a fee, the rule does not apply,"5 the reason being
that, first, the presumption made by the general rule is
based on the inconsistency of cutting down an absolute
and unrestricted fee, and would thus not apply where the
gift is not of an absolute estate, and second, the words
"death without issue" in such case do not import a substitutionary gift either to the first taker or the devisee in the
81Ibid., n. 30, 496.
Ibid., 499.

8,Supra, n. 30.
8Hollister v. Butterworth, 71 Conn. 57, 40 A. 1044 (1898) ; Fowler v.
Ingersoll, 127 N. Y. 472, 28 N. E. 471 (1891) ; Chesterfield v. Hoskin, 133
Wis. 368, 113 N. W. 647 (1907).
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limitation over, but they refer rather to the gift of the
remainder; e.g., where there is a gift "to A for life, and
if he die without issue then to B and C, but if he die leaving
issue then to such issue", the contingency of leaving issue
refers to the gift of the remainder, and the rule will not
operate to give A an absolute estate in fee merely because
he survived the testator. 6
While it is stated in all the cases that the rule is always
subject to a contrary intent of the testator appearing from
the context of the will, the decisions are somewhat conflicting as to how strong the showing of contrary intent
must be. Some courts say that the showing must be clear,
strong, and decisive in order to cut down a plain devise
in fee to a lesser estate.37 Other courts say that slight
circumstances evidencing a contrary intent will be laid
hold of to take the case out of the rule since the rule presumes an intent and gives an artificial effect to the language
rather than its ordinary and popular meaning. Thus there
has been. no establishment of any group of factors which
can be called exceptions so as to take the case out of the
general rule by evidencing a contrary intent. The question
of existence of a contrary intent must be decided in each
case solely on its own facts without any substantial aid
from established precedent.
Possibly the only factor which might be classed as an
exception to the general rule is the case where the gift
to the first taker is preceded by a life estate. In such a
situation, these courts, which state the general proposition
to be to refer the words to the period before the testator's
death, will generally take the case out of the general rule
and construe the words to refer to the period before the
termination of the preceding estate. 9 It is probably more
accurate to say that these courts are following the rule
of construction which so restricts the contingency in the
presence of an intervening life estate, rather than to call
it an exception to the general rule which these courts follow in the absence of such life estate. The New York cases,
however, seem generally to reject such a construction unless there is some other and stronger evidence of a contrary intent, and still restrict the contingency to the testa' Supra, n. 35.
Washbon v. Cope, supra, n. 25; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351, 40
N. E. 11 (1895) ; Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12 (1897).
18Lawrence v. Calam, 236 N. Y. 168, 140 N. E. 232 (1923) ; First Nat'l.
Bank v. DePauw, supra,n. 19.
McCormick v. McElligott, 127 Pa. 230, 17 A. 896 (1889).
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tor's lifetime regardless of a preceding life estate," and
this same result was reached in an Iowa case.4 This problem
will be more fully discussed in the next heading, the purpose here being merely to show what circumstances will
take the case out of the general rule followed by these
courts.
It may be well to point out that the discussion under this
heading has dealt with those cases which lay down, as a
general proposition, the rule giving the words a substitutionary construction and restricting the contingency to the
lifetime of the testator. Other courts, although not starting
out with this general proposition, may still find an intent
from the context of the will to so restrict the words.
Rule Which Limits the Contingency to Death Without
Issue Before Termination of an Antecedent Estate
There is a third rule of construction, separate and distinct from the first two discussed, which is said to govern
where there is a gift of a life estate with remainder to a
named person, but a limitation over to another in the
event that the remainderman should die without issue. In
such case, the presumption is said to be that the words
"death without issue" must be taken to refer to death of
the remainderman before the death of the life tenant, unless
42
a contrary intent appears from the context of the will.
This rule arose from the early English cases around the
time of the Edwards case and was based primarily on the
desire of the courts for an early vesting of title, while also
supposedly giving the phrase a rational application. It has
since been rejected in England,4 but seems to be still
adhered to in a majority of the jurisdictions in this country,
including those which ordinarily give the words their
natural and unrestricted meaning,4 4 and also those which
,o Embury v. Sheldon, 68 N. Y. 227 (1877) ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y.
433, 37 N. E. 515 (1894) ; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351, 40 N. E. 11 (1895).
41 Tarbell v. Smith, 125 Iowa 388, 101 N. W. 118 (1904).
'2 Smith v. Ballard, 117 Ky. 179, 77 S. W. 714 (1903) ; Davis v. Scharf,
99 N. J. Eq. 88 (1926) ; Pyne v. Pyne, 154 F. 2d 297, 81 U. S. App. D. C. 11
(1946) ; In Re Herrick's Will, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 413 (1946) ; Johnson v. Bolund,
343 Ill. 552, 175 N. E. 794 (1931).
SSupra, n. 11.

"Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W. 671 (1904); 25 L. R. A. N. S.
1067 n.; and see also Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue, 39 Yale
Law Journal 332 (1930); and Note, Future Interests: Construction of
"Death Without Issue" as Contingency for Gift Over When PriorBenefici.
ary's Estate is Preceded by Life Estate, 31 Cal. L. Rev. 695, where it is said
that, although the majority rule is otherwise, California still gives the words
their natural unrestricted meaning, probably on the theory that the words
should not have their natural meaning cut down save by a specific limitation, citing Musson v. Fuller, 54 Cal. App. 2d 5, 133 P. 2d 682 (1943).
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ordinarily restrict the contingency to the lifetime of the
testator, except New York, and possibly Iowa, and Indiana.4" The Restatement has also accepted this view in
Section 269, where the rule is stated as follows: "When
property is limited by an otherwise effective conveyance
'to B for life (or years), remainder to C and his heirs,
but if C dies without issue, then to D', or by other words
of similar import, then, unless a contrary intent of the
conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, the interest of D can become a present interest if,
but only if, C dies at or before the time of the termination
of the interest of B in accordance with the terms of the
limitation and is unsurvived by issue at the time of his
death." The rationale given for the rule, in Comment a., is
the reasonableness of the inference that such a construction
gives effect to the intent of the conveyor, and the convenience of as early indefeasibility of interests as is consistent
with the manifested intent of the testator.
This rule also seems to be well established in Maryland,4"
and was correctly followed in the principal case, although
the case relied on by the Court as authority for the rule
did not involve a limitation over upon death of the first
taker "without issue", but merely upon the death of the
first taker uncoupled with any other contingency, the
devise being to the children of a deceased brother of the
testator "... or their heirs", from which, the Court there
implied a contingency of death before the death of a preceding life tenant, and, since that event occurred, allowed
the gift to go to the heirs of deceased children.47 However,
the result in the principal case was good, even though the
authority cited is questionable.
Again, it should be emphasized that this rule is always
subject to the contrary intent of the testator, some courts
requiring a strong showing of contrary intent, and other
courts allowing slight circumstances to take the case out
" See supra, N. S. 39, 40, and 41; Taylor v. Stevens, 165 Ind. 200, 74 N. E.
980 (1905), where the contingency was restricted to the lifetime of the
testator regardless of intervening life estate.
"Hill v. Hill, 5 G. & J. 87 (1832) ; Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md. 50 (1882)
Booth v. Eberly, 124 Md. 22 (1914) ; and see also Godwin v. Kemp, and the
Lumpkin case, supra, n. 30, 499-500, where In the latter the court said,
"If the limitation over had in terms applied only to the portion of the
estate left to the wife for life with remainder to the children, much authori-ty could have been found in the Maryland cases for holding that the
children's death without issue meant a death during the life of the widow,
as the children were only to come into possession of the remainder at her
death. Indeed, it may be conceded that such would have been the weight
of authority in that event".
" Reiff v. Strite, 54 Md. 298 (1880).
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of the general rule. And it should also be pointed out that
there may be cases in which the context of the will, or
other circumstances surrounding the disposition of the
estate, manifests a clear intent that the contingency should
refer to the death of the life tenant, and in such cases even
those courts which do not recognize the rule as a rule of
construction, will, of course, give effect to the intent and
limit the contingency to the period of the life tenancy.
Rule Which Limits the Contingency to Other
Intermediate Periods Mentioned in the Will
Similar to the preceding rule which refers
the happening of the contingency to the termination of the antecedent
estate, the cases have established the presumption that
where there is some period mentioned or indicated in the
will, between the testator's death and the death of the
legatee or devisee, when distribution or full enjoyment of
the estate is to take place, then the intention must have
been to restrict the happening of the contingncy to that
interval." Thus where a testator makes an absolute gift
to an infant, to be distributed to him upon attaining the
age of twenty-one, but if he dies without issue then the
property is to go to another, the presumption is that the
words "death without issue" refers to the happening of
that event before the infant reaches twenty-one, and if he
survives that period of distribution, then he takes an indefeasible title regardless of whether he subsequently dies
without issue. This rule arose from the early English decisions on the point, and was a result of the tendency of the
courts to favor an early vesting of estates, and from the
belief that the first taker was the primary object of the
48 Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W. 671 (1904) ; In Re Kelley's Estate,
303 Pa. 391, 154 A. 719 (1931) ; Horrocks v. Basham, 139 Ark. 116, 213
S. W. 372 (1919) ; Horton v. Horton, 107 Misc. 685, 177 N. Y. S. 857 (1919) ;
Donnell v. Newburyport Homeopathic Hospital, 179 Mass. 187, 60 N. E. 482

(1901) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sect. 268, which states the rule as follows:

"When property is limited by an otherwise effective conveyance 'to B and
his heirs, but if B dies without issue, then to C', or by other language of
similar import, and (a) the conveyance further provides that for a described period the interest of B shall be subject to a trust, or to a similar
withholding of control, or to a defeasance, and (b) the ending of such
described period is likely to occur between the date upon which the conveyance speaks, and the date of B's death, then unless a contrary intent of
the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, the interest of C shall become a present interest if, but only if, B dies at or before
the end of such described period and is unsurvived by issue at the time
of his death". And see also note, Wills-Construction-Limnitationof Defeasance Clause, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1053 (1941). This rule is followed in
Maryland in Bentz v. Md. Bible Soc., 86 Md. 102 (1897) ; Gerting v. Wells,
100 Md. 93 (1904) ; and Clagett v. Bowie, 130 Md. 437 (1917).
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testator's bounty and thus that there was a reasonable
inference that the rule gave effect to the testator's intent.
In England this result is treated as an exception to the
general rule giving the words their unrestricted meaning,49
while in this country some courts treat it as a rule of construction giving rise to a presumption, and others, although
not basing the result upon any rule of construction, find an
intention on the part of the testator to restrict the contingency to the period of distribution."
It should be pointed out that the rule under discussion
here is also separate and distinct from the first two rules
discussed, the one giving the words their unrestricted meaning, and the latter restricting the contingency to death in
the testator's lifetime. As brought out in discussing the
exceptions to those rules, the courts, where the testator
has created a period of distribution, may still follow this
rule and limit the contingency to the period before distribution, merely following one of the other rules when no
such period is created. Also, the courts, whether following
one or the other of the first two rules, and not recognizing
the rule here as a rule of construction, may yet find that
the context of the will and surrounding circumstances evidence sufficient contrary intent to take the case out of the
general rule and thus restrict the contingency to the period
of distribution.
Association of the Contingency With Another Event
In some cases the testator has coupled the contingency
of death without issue with another event by use of the
conjunctive particle "and", or the disjunctive particle "or".
For example there may be a devise "to A, but if he die
without issue and before attaining the age of twenty-one,
then to B"; or a devise or bequest substituting the word
"or" for the word "and" in the above example. When the
word "and" is used, the natural effect is to confine the
contingency of death without issue to the period preceding
the happening of the event with which it is coupled, namely,
attaining the age of twenty-one, and if the devisee or legatee
lives to be twenty-one, his title becomes indefeasible, even
though he may subsequently die without issue. In other
words, the courts will not substitute the word "or" for the
word "and" unless the general scheme of the will necessiO'Mahoney v. Burdett, supra, n. 11.
10In Re Farmer's Loan & T. Co., 189 N. Y. 202, 82 N. E. 181 (1907);
Shearer v. Miller, 185 Pa. 149, 39 A. 846 (1898) ; Van Houten v. Pennington,
8 N. J. Eq. 745 (1852) ; Price v. Johnson, 90 N. C. 592.

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XI

tates the substitution, and thus the cases hold that the
limitation over cannot take effect unless both of the contingencies occur, i.e. that the devisee dies without issue
and before reaching twenty-one. 1 However, where the
contingency of death without issue was coupled with a
dying unmarried, as in a gift "to A, but if he should die
unmarried and without issue, then to B", the early English
cases held that the word "and" should be read as "or", it
being presumed that since the two were used together
the testator did not intend that the limitation over might
be defeated by the marriage of the donee without any
resulting children,52 which would be the result if the word
"and" were given its natural effect. The American cases
seem to be in conflict on whether to convert "and" to "or"
when used to couple the contingency of death without
issue to the contingency of marriage, an early53Maryland
case having followed the early English decisions.
The most frequent problem arising seems to be where
the word "or" is used to couple death without issue with
the contingency of death before a stated age, as where
there is a gift "to A, but if he die without issue or before
attaining the age of twenty-one, then to B". If the word
"or" were given its natural effect, the limitation over would
operate either upon death before twenty-one with or without issue, or upon death without issue before or after reaching twenty-one. Thus if the legatee or devisee had issue
before reaching twenty-one, but also died before that age,
the limitation over would take effect and his issue would
be disinherited. It is chiefly for this reason that the courts
have said that the word "or" must be read as "and", reaching the result that if the first taker either attains the age
of twenty-one or has issue before that time, the gift in him
becomes indefeasible. 54
As to the result when the word "or" is used to couple
death without issue with the event of marriage, the American cases are again in conflict, some courts saying that the
limitation over will not take effect unless both of the contingencies happen, thus converting the word "or" to read
1 Malcolm v. Malcolm, 21 Beav. 225; Allen v. Allen, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1157,
108 S. W. 250 (1908) ; Sayward v. Sayward, 7 Me. 210, 22 Am. Dec. 191
(1831) ; Thorton v. Krepps, 37 Pa. 391 (1860) ; Dallam v. Dallam, 7 Harr.
& J. 220 (1826).
12 Bell v. Phyn, 7 Yes. Jr. 453.
'8Janney v. Spriggs, 7 Gill 197, 48 Am. Dec. 557 (1848).
14 Morris v. Morris, 17 Beav. 198; and uniformly recognized as a settled
rule in this country in Kindig v. Deardorf, 39 Ill. 300 (1866) ; Shreve v.
MacCrellish, 60 N. J. Eq. 198, 46 A. 581 (1900) ; Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. 9
(1869) ; Neal v. Cosden, 34 Md. 421 (1871).
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as "and",55 and others retaining the disjunctive particle
"or", thus causing the limitation over to operate upon the
happening of either of the contingencies."
It should be pointed out that the discussion of this aspect
of the construction of the phrase is intended merely to
create an awareness of the problems rather than to state
or explain any rules of law to be obtained from the decisions.
Summary and Conclusions
By way of summary it may be said that where there
is an absolute gift to one legatee or devisee, with a limitation
over to another in the event that the first taker dies without
issue, then, unless the context of the will manifests a contrary intent, the majority of cases and the weight of authority support the rule of construction which gives the words
"death without issue", or words of similar import, their
natural unrestricted meaning, and hold that the limitation
over will become operative should the first taker die without surviving issue, whenever that event occurs. On the
other hand, a substantial minority of cases follow that rule
of construction which restricts the happening of the contingency to the lifetime of the testator, and hold that if
the first taker survives the testator, the estate in him becomes indefeasible, even though he may subsequently die
without issue. The Restatement of Property throws its
weight in favor of the former rule, pointing out in Comment
(i) of Section 266 that the wisest policy is to avoid the necessity of applying any rule of construction by putting the
gift in proper form to show the exact intent of the testator.
The proper forms are suggested by the drafters in that
comment. It is believed by this writer that the question
remains open in Maryland, even though the results reached
in the later cases are the same as the minority rule, due
to the fact that those results seem to be based clearly on the
special context of the will.
Where the gift to the first taker is preceded by a life
estate, or where the period of distribution and possession
of the first taker is postponed, essentially all the American
cases adopt the rule referring the contingency of "death
without issue" to the termination of the life tenancy or
the period before distribution, respectively, with only sev61Denn v. Woodward, 1 Yeates 316; Morse v. Church, 15 R. I. 336, 5 A. 501
(1886).
" Harwell v. Benson, 8 Lea. 344; and by inference from Janey v. Spriggs,
supra,n. 53.
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eral cases in this country following the rule now established
in England which, in the case of a preceding life estate,
gives the words their unrestricted meaning and applies the
contingency to death without issue whenever it occurs.

A QUERY ABOUT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE
Vogelsang v. Sehlhorst'
Plaintiffs, the driver of an automobile and his passenger,
sued defendants, the owner and the driver of a taxicab, for
personal injuries sustained in a collision due to the alleged
negligence of the taxicab driver. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed from
judgments entered thereon. Both vehicles at the time of
the collision had been travelling west on that part of
Edmondson Avenue in Baltimore City which is classified
as a dual lane highway. The portion of the highway used
by westbound traffic is designated as a one-way street
(with signs so indicating) and is separated from the
portion for eastbound traffic by a parkway and streetcar
tracks. The automobile was proceeding next to the parkway at a moderate speed, when the taxi driver sounded his
horn to signal his intention to pass. The automobile driver
held to the left and the cab driver then attempted to pass
on the right. The collision occurred when the taxi driver
had to swerve to his left to avoid hitting a parked car. As
he did so, the left rear fender of the cab came in contact
with the right front fender of the automobile causing it to
jump the curb of the parkway and strike a pole.
The driver of the automobile testified that the accident
was due to the fact that the cab driver cut to his left before
he had completely passed his automobile. He also testified
that if he had pulled over to the right when the taxi driver
sounded his horn, he might have hit a parked car. Both
plaintiffs asserted that the automobile did not alter its
course nor increase its speed prior to the collision. The
taxi driver admitted that he had swerved to his left to
avoid a parked car, but claimed that he had fully passed
the plaintiff's car before doing so, as he had seen the
plaintiff's lights in his rearview mirror. He did not testify
that he signaled before cutting to the left. He testified that
171 A. 2d 295 (Md. 1950).

